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We propose a novel and efficient method, that we shall call TopRank
in the following paper, for detecting change-points in high-dimensional
data. This issue is of growing concern to the network security com-
munity since network anomalies such as Denial of Service (DoS) at-
tacks lead to changes in Internet traffic. Our method consists of a
data reduction stage based on record filtering, followed by a non-
parametric change-point detection test based on U -statistics. Using
this approach, we can address massive data streams and perform
anomaly detection and localization on the fly. We show how it applies
to some real Internet traffic provided by France-Te´le´com (a French
Internet service provider) in the framework of the ANR-RNRT OS-
CAR project. This approach is very attractive since it benefits from
a low computational load and is able to detect and localize several
types of network anomalies. We also assess the performance of the
TopRank algorithm using synthetic data and compare it with alter-
native approaches based on random aggregation.
1. Introduction. Recent attacks on very popular web sites such as Ya-
hoo and eBay, leading to a disruption of services to users, have triggered
an increasing interest in network anomaly detection. Typical examples in-
clude Denial of Service (DoS) attacks—a network-based attack in which
agents intentionally saturate system resources—and their distributed ver-
sion (DDoS). Since the aforementioned attacks represent serious threats for
computer networks, developing anomaly detection systems for ensuring the
defense against them has become a major concern.
Existing detection systems to deal with DoS or DDoS attacks are based on
two different approaches. The first one is a signature-based approach which
compares the observed patterns of the network traffic with known attack
templates. If the attack belongs to the set of known attacks listed in the
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database, then it can be successfully detected: Snort and Bro developed by
Roesch (1999) and Paxson (1999), respectively, are two examples of such
anomaly detection systems. The obvious limitation of this approach is that
the signature of the anomaly has to be known in advance.
The second detection system is based on statistical tools which do not
require any prior information about the kind of anomalies we are faced
with. As a consequence, this approach aims at detecting anomalies which
do not belong to a prescribed database. It relies on the fact that anoma-
lies in network traffic lead to abrupt changes in some network character-
istics. We choose those characteristics according to the type of attacks
we are looking for. These changes occur at unknown time instants and
have to be detected as soon as possible. Detecting an attack in the net-
work traffic can thus be described as a change-point detection problem,
which is a classical issue in statistics. The detection can either be per-
formed with a fixed delay (batch approach) or with a minimal average
delay (sequential approach). We refer to Basseville and Nikiforov (1993),
Brodsky and Darkhovsky (1993), Cso¨rgo and Horvath (1997) and the ref-
erences therein for a complete overview of the existing methods in statistical
change-point detection.
The most widespread change-point detection technique in the field of
network anomaly detection is the cumulated sum (CUSUM) algorithm which
was first proposed by Page (1954). The CUSUM algorithm has already been
used by Wang, Zhang and Shin (2002) and Siris and Papagalou (2004) for
detecting DoS attacks of the TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) SYN
flooding type. Such an attack consists in exploiting the TCP three-way hand-
shake mechanism and its limitation in maintaining half-open connections.
More precisely, when a server receives a SYN packet, it returns a SYN/ACK
packet to the client. Until the SYN/ACK packet is acknowledged by the
client, the connection remains half-opened for a period of at most the TCP
connection timeout. A backlog queue builds up in the system memory of the
server to maintain all half-open connections, possibly leading to a saturation
of the server. In Siris and Papagalou (2004), the authors use the CUSUM
algorithm to look for a change-point in the time series corresponding to the
sum of received SYN packets by all the destination IP addresses which have
been requested. With such an approach, it is only possible to set off an alarm
when a change occurs in the aggregated series, but it is impossible to pick
out the malicious flows.
Taking into account the previous definition of a TCP/SYN flooding type
attack, it would be natural, in order to identify the IP addresses involved
in the attack, to analyze the time series corresponding to the number of
TCP/SYN packets received by each IP address, to apply to each of them
a change-point detection test and to say that it is attacked if the test sets
off an alarm. This idea is used in Tartakovsky et al. (2006a, 2006b), who
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propose a multichannel detection procedure which is a refined version of the
previously quoted algorithms: it makes it possible to detect changes which
occur in a channel and which could be obscured by the normal traffic in the
other channels if global statistics were used. Note that these methods only
focus on the number of TCP/SYN packets received by a given destination
IP address and not on the number of TCP/SYN packets sent by a given
source IP address to a given destination IP address. Applying a change-
point detection test to the latter time series to detect an anomaly is bound
to fail because of spoofing, a method used by attackers which makes their
IP address appear as a random address on the Internet.
Operators seeking to understand and manage their networks are increas-
ingly looking at wide-area-network traffic flows. In this framework, pre-
vious methods are bound to failure since the quantity of data to ana-
lyze is too massive. Indeed, each flow is characterized by 5 fields: source
and destination IP addresses, source and destination ports and protocol
number, which produces a very large database to store and study. In or-
der to detect anomalies in such massive data streams within a reason-
able time span, it is impossible to analyze the time series of all the IP
addresses receiving TCP/SYN packets. That is why dimension reduction
techniques have to be used. Two main approaches have been proposed:
some of them are based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) tech-
niques [see Lakhina, Crovella and Diot (2004)] and others on random ag-
gregation (sketches); see Krishnamurthy et al. (2003) and Li et al. (2006).
Localization of the anomalies is possible with the second approach using
hash table inversion techniques; see Salem, Vaton and Gravey (2007) and
Abry, Borgnat and Dewaele (2007).
In this paper we propose a novel algorithm for detecting change-points in
a multi-dimensional time series (N∆i (t))t≥1, i ∈ {1, . . . ,D}, under computa-
tional constraints which allow us to process the data on the fly, even for a
high dimension D. Our method can be used for identifying DoS and DDoS
attacks as well as PortScan and NetScan in Internet traffic in cases where we
are faced with massive data streams. More precisely, we can identify anoma-
lies of the following types: TCP/SYN flooding, UDP flooding, PortScan and
NetScan. UDP flooding is an attack similar to TCP/SYN flooding which
aims at saturating the memory of a destination IP address by sending a
lot of UDP packets. A PortScan consists in sending TCP packets to each
port of a machine to know which ones are open. In a NetScan attack, a
source IP address sends packets to a large number of IP addresses in order
to detect the machines which are connected to the network. The problem of
change-point detection in high-dimensional data mainly concerns the net-
work security community but, in our view, it is a challenging issue which
will benefit a broader audience.
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Let us now give an outline of this paper. Section 2 describes the framework
of our study. In Section 3 we describe the different methods that we propose
to detect change-points in a multi-dimensional time series under computa-
tional constraints. These approaches are based on two different dimension
reduction techniques: TopRank uses record filtering, whereas HashRank is
based on random aggregation. The detection stage uses a nonparametric
change-point detection test based on U -statistics. More precisely, we used
rank tests for censored data as proposed and analyzed in Gombay and Liu
(2000). The corresponding algorithms have been written in C language [for
TopRank, see Le´vy-Leduc, Benmammar and Roueff (2008)] and applied to
real datasets corresponding to some Internet traffic provided by France-
Te´le´com (a French Internet Service Provider) within the framework of the
ANR-RNRT OSCAR project. In Section 4 we apply the TopRank algorithm
to a set of real Internet traffic provided by France-Te´le´com which contains
SYN flooding type attacks in order to explain how to choose the most rel-
evant parameters. In Section 5 TopRank is applied to a set of real data
containing several types of attacks: SYN flooding, UDP flooding and also
PortScan and NetScan. Our research indicates that our method can be used
to analyze a very large amount of data and to detect network anomalies
on the fly. The methods TopRank and HashRank are finally compared first
from a theoretical point of view on a toy example in Section 6 and then with
Monte Carlo experiments on synthetic data in Section 7.
2. Description of the data. In Network applications the raw data consists
of Netflow type data collected at several points of the Internet network and
put into a single Netflow type table. The data at our disposal includes the
source and destination IP addresses, the source and destination ports, the
start time and the end time of the flow, as well as the protocol and the
number of exchanged packets. In the case of the TCP protocol, the number
of packets of each type (SYN, SYN/ACK, FIN, RST) is available.
Depending on the type of attack that one wants to detect, some time
indexed traffic characteristics are of particular interest and have to be pro-
cessed for detection purposes. For instance, in the case of the TCP/SYN
flooding, the quantity of interest is the number of TCP/SYN packets re-
ceived by each destination IP address per unit of time.
We denote by ∆ the smallest time unit used for building time series from
our raw Netflow type data. The time series are built as follows: in the case
of TCP/SYN flooding, we shall denote by N∆i (t) the number of TCP/SYN
packets received by the destination IP address i in the sub-interval indexed
by t of size ∆ seconds. The corresponding time series of the destination
IP address i will thus be (N∆i (t))t≥1. In the case of UDP flooding, N
∆
i (t)
will be defined as the number of UDP packets received by the destination
IP address i in the tth sub-interval of size ∆ seconds. For a PortScan, we
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shall take as N∆i (t) the number of different requested destination ports of
the destination IP address i in the tth sub-interval of size ∆ seconds and
for a NetScan, it will be the number of different requested destination IP
addresses by the source IP address i. For Scan attacks, the source address is
reliable (spoofing cannot be used) since the attackers wish to receive packets
responding to their requests.
Our goal is now to provide algorithms for detecting change-points in the
time series (N∆i (t))t≥1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,D} under computational con-
straints which make it possible to process the data on the fly, even for a
high dimension D. For instance, in the case of TCP/SYN flooding, D is the
number of destination IP addresses appearing in the raw data and can be
huge, up to several thousand addresses within a minute and several million
within a few days.
For convenience, in the following we will drop the superscript ∆ in the
notation N∆i (t).
3. Description of the methods. We shall only consider batch methods in
the following. The traffic is analyzed in successive observation windows, each
having a duration of P ×∆ seconds, for some fixed integer P . A decision
concerning the presence of potentially attacked IP addresses is made at
the end of each observation window and we also identify the IP addresses
involved. The value of D then corresponds to the number of different i
encountered in the observation window of time length P ×∆ seconds.
A crude solution for detecting change-points in the time series (Ni(t))1≤t≤P
would be to apply a change-point detection test to each time series (Ni(t))1≤t≤P
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,D}. Since D can be huge even in a given observation win-
dow (see Figure 3 in Section 4.1), we are faced in practice with massive data
streams leading to the construction and the analysis of several thousands of
time series even for short observation periods (around 1 minute). To over-
come this difficulty, a data reduction stage must precede the change-point
detection step.
In the following, we propose two different data reduction mechanisms:
record filtering and random aggregation (sketches). In short, the record fil-
tering will select the heavy-hitters among the flows involved and process
them, while the random aggregation will construct and process several (ran-
domly chosen) linear combinations of all the flows. Random aggregation is
currently the dimension reduction mechanism which is the most used in
the network security community. Nevertheless, we believe that for the pur-
pose of change-point detection, in particular, if the change-points involve
a massive increase, record filtering would be a more efficient alternative.
At first glance, random aggregation has the advantage of processing all the
data. However, heavy-hitters are mixed with many other flows, which may
smooth the change-points and result in poor detection. On the other hand,
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heavy-hitters are selected with high probability in record filtering and their
change-points are more likely to be detected. To support this idea, we de-
rive a toy problem related to this question in Section 6 and perform some
numerical experiments on synthetic data in Section 7.
As for the change-point detection step, we propose using nonparamet-
ric tests based on U -statistics which do not require any prior information
concerning the distribution of the time series constructed after the dimen-
sion reduction step. Such an approach is of particular interest for dealing
with Internet traffic data, for which there is a lack of commonly accepted
parametric models.
In the following we shall refer to record filtering followed by a nonpara-
metric change-point detection test as the TopRank algorithm and when the
record filtering stage is replaced by random aggregation, the HashRank al-
gorithm. Both algorithms are further described below.
3.1. The TopRank method. The TopRank algorithm can be split into
three steps described hereafter. Note that the following processing is per-
formed in each observation window of length P ×∆ seconds and that all the
stored data is erased at the end of each observation window.
Step 1 (Record filtering). The main dimension reduction takes place in
this step. In each sub-interval indexed by t ∈ {1, . . . , P} of duration ∆ sec-
onds of the observation window, we keep the indices i of theM largest Ni(t)
and label them as i1(t), . . . , iM (t) in such a way that Ni1(t)(t)≥Ni2(t)(t)≥
· · · ≥NiM (t)(t). In the following we shall denote by TM (t) the following set:
TM(t) = {i1(t), . . . , iM (t)}.
In other words, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , P},
#TM(t) =M and ∀i ∈ TM(t) and ∀j /∈ TM (t), Ni(t)≥Nj(t).
We stress that, in order to perform the following steps, we only need to store
the variables {Ni(t), i ∈ TM(t), t= 1, . . . , P}.
Step 2 (Creation of censored time series). In this stage we shall build
censored time series to be analyzed in the last step. For a given index i,
the corresponding time series is censored since it is possible that for a given
t in {1, . . . , P}, i does not belong to the set TM (t). In this case its value
Ni(t) is not available and is censored using the upper bound NiM (t)(t) =
mini∈TM (t)Ni(t). More formally, the censored time series is defined by
(Xi(t), δi(t))1≤t≤P ,(1)
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where, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , P},
Xi(t) =
{
Ni(t), if i ∈ TM (t),
min
j∈TM (t)
Nj(t), otherwise,
δi(t) =
{
1, if i ∈ TM (t),
0, otherwise.
The value of δi(t) tells us if the corresponding value Xi(t) has been cen-
sored or not. Observe that, by definition, δi(t) = 1 implies Xi(t) =Ni(t) and
δi(t) = 0 implies Xi(t)≥Ni(t).
In practice, the censored time series are only built for indices i selected
in the first step, that is, i ∈⋃Pt=1 TM (t). However, many such time series will
be highly censored. Hence, we propose an additional dimension reduction
which consists in considering only the indices
i ∈
P⋃
t=1
TM ′(t),
where M ′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} is a chosen parameter.
Step 3 (Change-point detection test). In Gombay and Liu (2000) a
nonparametric statistical change-point detection method is proposed to an-
alyze censored data, as well as a way of computing its p-values. It is a
nonparametric rank test using a score function (denoted by A in the fol-
lowing) which was first introduced by Gehan (1965) and Mantel (1967) in
their generalization of Wilcoxon’s rank test for censored data. We apply this
test to each time series created in Step 2. Note that each of these time series
is removed when the analysis in a given observation window is complete.
With such an approach, up to M ′×P time series of length P are processed
in each observation window of time length P ×∆ seconds.
Let us now further describe the statistical test that we perform. This
procedure aims at testing from the observations (Xi(t), δi(t))1≤t≤P built in
the previous step if a change occurred in the time series (Ni(t))1≤t≤P for
a given i. More precisely, if we drop the subscript i for convenience in the
description of the test, the tested hypotheses are as follows:
(H0): “{N(t)}1≤t≤P are independent and identically distributed random
variables.”
(H1): “There exists some r such that (N(1), . . . ,N(r)) and (N(r+1), . . . ,
N(P )) have a different distribution.”
Let us now describe the test statistic that we use. For each s, t ∈ {1, . . . , P},
we define the following:
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• As,t = 1(X(s)>X(t), δ(s) = 1)− 1(X(s)<X(t), δ(t) = 1), where 1(E) =
1 in the event E and 0 in its complementary set,
• Us =
∑P
t=1As,t, s= 1, . . . , P,
• St = (
∑t
s=1Us)/(
∑P
s=1U
2
s )
1/2, t= 1, . . . , P .
We shall use
WP = max
1≤t≤P
|St|(2)
as a test statistic. Since, under (H0) [see Gombay and Liu (2000)],
WP
d−→B⋆ = sup
0<t<1
|B(t)| as P →∞,
where {B(t), t ∈ [0,1]} denotes a Brownian bridge and d the convergence in
distribution, we shall take for the change-point detection test the following
p-value: Pval(WP ), where for all b > 0,
Pval(b) = P(B⋆ > b) = 2
∞∑
j=1
(−1)j−1e−2j2b2 , b > 0.
The last equality is given in Gombay and Liu (2000). These results can be
proved by remarking that the numerator of St is a U -statistic and the denom-
inator is the normalization which ensures the convergence in distribution of
WP . All these results are proved in detail in Liu (1998) and Midodzi (2001),
under specific assumptions. Then, for a given asymptotic level α ∈ (0,1), we
reject (H0) when
Pval(WP )< α.(3)
In the rejection case, the change-point instant is given by
tˆP =Argmax
1≤t≤P
|St|.
3.2. The HashRank method. In this approach we propose another method
to perform the data reduction stage based on hash functions. As explained
previously, the following processing is performed in each observation window
of length P ×∆ seconds and all the stored data is erased at the end of each
observation window.
Step 1 (Filtering using hash functions). Let us define a hash table with
L rows and K columns. We consider L hash functions hℓ, ℓ= 1, . . . ,L, each
taking its value in {1, . . . ,K}. To each entry (ℓ, k) ∈ {1, . . . ,L}× {1, . . . ,K}
of the hash table is associated the list Lℓ,k of the indices i which are hashed
into this entry and a time series (Xℓ,k(t))1≤t≤P defined by
Xℓ,k(t) =
∑
i
1(hℓ(i) = k)Ni(t), t= 1, . . . , P.
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Step 2 (Change-point detection test). We perform a statistical change-
point detection test on each of the time series previously obtained. Let us
denote by C the set of cells (ℓ, k), ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,L}, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, of the hash
table in which a change occurred. The test statistic that we use is the same
as the one explained in Section 3.1 (nonparametric rank tests), except that
the terms related to the censorship are removed.
Step 3 (Inversion of the hash table). Assuming that a time series
(Ni(t))1≤t≤P which contains a change-point will yield a change-point in the
L time series
(Xℓ,hℓ(i)(t))1≤t≤P , ℓ= 1, . . . ,L,
we classify i as an anomaly if a change-point has occurred in the time series
associated to the cell (ℓ, hℓ(i)) for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,L}. In practice, the set of
such indices is obtained from the lists Lℓ,k and the set C defined in the
previous steps as follows:⋂
1≤ℓ≤L
LCℓ , where LCℓ =
⋃
k:(ℓ,k)∈C
Lℓ,k.
Several types of hash functions can be considered in the first step, but we
shall only focus on random hashing because of its low computational load.
We shall use 4-universal hashing functions for which a fast implementation
is described in Thorup and Zhang (2004). Such functions are used since
they are known to ensure a small number of collisions (a collision occurs
when the L different hashing functions have the same output when applied
to two different indices i). Collisions may yield a false alarm during Step
3 described above. More precisely, following Abry, Borgnat and Dewaele
(2007), we shall take as hash functions the following (hℓ)ℓ=1,...,L:
hℓ(x) = 1+
(
3∑
j=0
aj,ℓ x
kmodp
)
modK,(4)
where x is a 32-bit integer (making this method particularly well suited for
the hashing of IP addresses), and p is the Mersenne prime number 261−1. As
for the (aj,ℓ)’s, they are picked randomly in {0, . . . , p− 1} with independent
outputs from one hash function to another.
4. Application to real data with attacks of SYN flooding type. In this
section we give the results of the TopRank algorithm when it is applied to
some real Internet traffic provided by France-Te´le´com within the framework
of the ANR-RNRT OSCAR project and we give some hints about the choice
of the different parameters involved.
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This data corresponds to a recording of 118 minutes of ADSL (Asymmet-
ric Digital Subscriber Line) and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) traffic to which some
TCP/SYN flooding type attacks have been added. Figure 1 (left) displays
the total number of TCP packets received each second by the different re-
quested IP addresses. The number of TCP/SYN packets received by the four
attacked destination IP addresses are displayed on the right in Figure 1. As
we can see in this figure, the first attack occurs at around 2000 seconds, the
second at around 4000 seconds, the third at around 6000 seconds and the
last one at around 6500 seconds.
From Figure 1, we can see that we are faced with massive data streams
and that the attacks are completely hidden in TCP traffic and thus difficult
to detect.
4.1. Choice of parameters. As described above, Step 1 (the record filter-
ing step) and Step 2 (the creation of the censored time series) of the TopRank
algorithm rely on several parameters (P,∆,M for Step 1 andM ′ for Step 2).
As for Step 3 (the change-point detection test), it does not require the tun-
ing of any parameters. The main objective of the first two steps is to cope
with high dimensionality and the requirements of real time implementation.
The choice of the parameters must satisfy these requirements as well as a
reasonable average detection delay and a relevant selection of the time se-
ries to be processed in the subsequent detection step. In the following, we
give some guidance regarding parameter selection in the context of Network
anomaly detection.
Since a decision concerning the presence of attacks is made at the end
of each observation window, the maximal detection delay is given by the
time length of the observation window, that is, P ×∆ seconds. The average
Fig. 1. Number of TCP packets exchanged and number of TCP/SYN packets received by
the 4 attacked IP addresses.
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detection delay is then given by P ×∆/2 seconds (typically about 30 seconds
in the context of Network anomaly detection). Once the average detection
delay has been chosen, one should choose P as large as possible under the
constraints of real time data processing for a given maximal number of tests
to perform within the observation window. Indeed, a large P ensures a better
statistical consistency. On the other hand, the test statistic WP in (2) has
an O(P 2) computational complexity. Given the computational limits of a
standard computer, we chose P = 60 in order to allow up to 103 time series
to be processed within a 1 minute observation window.
Let us now explain the choice of M , which sets the censorship level. In-
deed, the number of TCP/SYN packets received by theM th most requested
machine corresponds to a threshold above which an IP address may appear
as potentially attacked. From the data, we remark that 99% of the observed
values of this threshold are at most 10 when M = 10 and at most 5 for
M = 20. In the applications to real data, we chose M = 10 to allow us to
capture flows with significantly high traffic rates (10 packets per second)
while ensuring a low cost in terms of memory storage. Recall that a M ×P
data table (Xi(t), δi(t))1≤t≤P,1≤i≤M has to be stored during the first and
second step.
We now comment on the choice of the parameter M ′ in {1, . . . ,M}. Tak-
ing M ′ = 1 means that we only analyze the IP addresses i having, at least
once in an observation window, the largest Ni(t). Taking M
′ =M means
that the detection step is applied to the censored time series of all IP ad-
dresses i which have been selected in the filtering step. Hence, increasing
M ′ increases the number of analyzed censored time series. Figure 2 displays
the number of time series which are actually built in Step 2 of TopRank
after the filtering stage of Step 1 for different values of M ′: M ′ = 1, M ′ = 5
and M ′ =M = 10 when we are looking for TCP/SYN flooding type attacks.
Figure 3 displays the number of different destination IP addresses every
minute of the traffic trace. Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 3, we see that
Steps 1 and 2 of the TopRank algorithm appear to be necessary to provide
an implementation feasible on the fly. Indeed, applying Step 3 to each IP
address every minute would produce an excessive computational load. As
for the statistical performance of the method with respect to the parameter
M ′, we shall see in the following section that the parameter M ′ does not
significantly change the results in terms of false alarm and detection rates.
4.2. Performance of the method. We now investigate the performance
of the TopRank algorithm with the following parameters: P = 60, ∆ = 1 s,
M = 10 and M ′ = 1. Using these parameters, the average detection delay is
30 seconds.
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Fig. 2. Number of analyzed time series every minute when M ′ = 1 (“∗”), M ′ = 5 (“ o”)
and M ′ =M = 10 (“+”).
4.2.1. Statistical performance. First, note that with the previous choice
of parameters the attacked IP addresses have been identified when the upper
bound of the p-value α introduced in Step 3 of TopRank is such that α≥
2× 10−6.
Figure 4 displays the censored time series (Step 2 of TopRank) of the
four attacked IP addresses. These censored time series are displayed in the
first observation window in which the algorithm detects the anomaly. We
also display with a vertical line the instant where the change is detected. Re-
Fig. 3. Number of destination IP addresses every minute.
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member that the uncensored time series of these 4 IP addresses are displayed
in Figure 1 (right).
The TopRank part of Table 1 gives the smallest p-value above which the
corresponding attack is detected, as well as the number of false alarms.
The number of false alarms corresponds to the number of IP addresses for
which an alarm is triggered but which are different from the attacked IP
addresses. For instance, the first attack is detected if α≥ 10−8 [see (3)] and
the associated number of false alarms is equal to 3. If M ′ = 5 or M ′ =M =
10, the results remain unchanged except for the third attack for which the
number of false alarms equals 10 instead of 9.
In Table 1 we also give the results obtained from the same data with a
method proposed by Siris and Papagalou (2004). This algorithm uses the
CUSUM algorithm to look for a change-point in the time series correspond-
ing to the sum of received SYN packets by all the destination IP addresses
which have been requested. For each observation window of 60 seconds, an
alarm is set off when the statistic gn defined in equation (6) of Siris and
Fig. 4. Censored time series of the 4 attacked IP addresses, where the vertical lines
correspond to the detected change-point instants and the uncensored values are displayed
with stars (“∗”).
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Table 1
Statistical performance for detecting the 4 successive SYN flooding attacks displayed on
the right-hand side of Figure 1. The attacks consist in sending SYN packets to a given
destination IP address. In the top row the intensity (number of SYN packets per second)
of each attack is given. In the TopRank part of the table, the displayed p-values are the
smallest ones that ensure the detection of the attack by the TopRank algorithm and below
that the corresponding number of false alarms in the whole traffic trace is given. In the
SP part of the table [SP is the method devised by Siris and Papagalou (2004)], the h row
gives the smallest threshold values that ensure the detection of each attack. In the last
row the corresponding number of false alarms is displayed
Number of SYN packets 1000 500 200 50
TopRank p-values 10−8 10−10 2× 10−6 10−12
Number of false alarms 3 1 9 0
SP h 5 6.5 9.7 16.34
Number of false alarms 69 65 62 22
Papagalou (2004) is greater than a threshold h at least once in the win-
dow. This quantity gn depends on two parameters α and β. We use the
same values as Siris and Papagalou (2004), namely, α= 0.5 and β = 0.98, to
obtain the results displayed in Table 1. We observe that the TopRank algo-
rithm allows us not only to retrieve the attacked destination IP addresses,
but also seems to perform better in terms of false alarm rate. This suggests
that aggregating traffic flows results in a poor detection of malicious flows,
especially when the normal traffic is high. Indeed, a close look shows that
the normal traffic is particularly high during the first attack, which explains
why the corresponding threshold value is the lowest (and the false alarm rate
the highest) although this attack is the most intense. We shall investigate
the comparison between record filtering and aggregation filtering further, in
Sections 6 and 7, in terms of information loss and detection performance
respectively.
To compute the number of false alarms, we have considered that the
attacked IP addresses were only those for which an attack was generated,
but it is possible that the underlying ADSL and P2P traffic contains some
other attacks. Figure 5 displays the censored time series of some IP addresses
which were considered to be false alarms in the TopRank part of Table 1, as
well as the time instant where a change was detected (vertical line). However,
if we refer to their time series, these IP addresses could be considered as
being attacked. Thus, the results shown in Table 1 have been computed in
the most unfavorable way for the algorithms.
4.2.2. Numerical performance. As we have seen, the TopRank algorithm
seems to give satisfactory results from a statistical point of view. Moreover,
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Fig. 5. Censored time series for IP addresses considered as false alarms, where the
vertical lines correspond to the detected change-point instants and the uncensored values
are displayed with stars (“∗”).
with M = 10, M ′ = 1, and P = 60, applying the TopRank algorithm takes
only 1 minute and 19 seconds to process the whole traffic trace of 118 min-
utes, when looking for TCP/SYN flooding type attacks with a computer
having the following configuration: RAM 1 GB, CPU 3 GHz.
5. Application to real data with several kinds of attacks. In this section
we shall show that the TopRank algorithm can not only detect SYN flooding
type attacks but also any other kind of attacks, such as UDP flooding,
PortScan and NetScan attacks. As we shall see in the following, the TopRank
algorithm can detect, identify the anomaly and also provide the IP addresses
involved.
The real data of this section has been provided by France-Te´le´com In-
ternet Service Provider within the framework of the ANR-RNRT OSCAR
project. It corresponds to a recording of 67 minutes of ADSL and P2P traffic
to which some attacks of the following types, SYN flooding, UDP flooding,
PortScan and NetScan, have been added.
The top of Figure 6 displays the total number of TCP packets, as well as
the number of TCP packets received by the destination IP address attacked
by a PortScan. The bottom of Figure 6 displays the total number of packets,
as well as the number of packets sent by the source IP address generating a
NetScan attack.
In Figure 6 we can see, as in Section 4, that the attacks are completely
hidden in the total traffic and thus difficult to detect.
5.1. Choice of parameters. The previous data has been processed using
the same parameters as those used in Section 4: P = 60, ∆ = 1 s, M = 10
and M ′ = 1. Note that the reduction stage (Step 1 of TopRank) is also
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Fig. 6. Number of exchanged packets for PortScan and NetScan attacks.
necessary for the analysis of this dataset. Indeed, in Figure 7, which displays
the number of different destination IP addresses each minute of the traffic
trace, we can see that Step 3 cannot be applied to each IP address at every
minute in a reasonable computational time.
5.2. Performance of the method.
5.2.1. Statistical performance. First, note that with the previous choice
of parameters the attacked IP addresses have been identified when the upper
bound of the p-value α introduced in Step 3 of TopRank is such that α≥
10−11 for the PortScan, α≥ 10−6 for the UDP flooding, α≥ 0.0006 for the
SYN flooding and α≥ 0.04 for the NetScan.
Figure 8 displays the censored time series (Step 2 of TopRank) of the at-
tacked IP addresses in the case of SYN flooding, UDP flooding and PortScan,
as well as the censored time series of the source IP address generating the
attack in the case of NetScan. These time series are displayed in the first
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Fig. 7. Number of destination IP addresses each minute.
Fig. 8. Censored time series of the attacked IP addresses, where the vertical lines corre-
spond to the detected change-point instants and the uncensored values are displayed with
stars (“∗”).
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Table 2
Statistical performance of the TopRank algorithm for detecting several types of attacks.
In the second row are displayed the smallest p-values that ensure the detection of the
PortScan, SYN flooding, UDP flooding and NetScan type attacks respectively. In the last
row, the corresponding number of false alarms is given
PortScan SYN flooding UDP flooding NetScan
p-values 10−11 6× 10−4 10−6 0.04
Number of false alarms 3 127 136 378
observation window in which the algorithm detects the anomaly of the cor-
responding type. We also display with a vertical line the instant where the
change is detected. The detection time delay is equal to around 1 minute
for the SYN flooding, 5 seconds for the UDP flooding, 30 seconds for the
PortScan and 20 seconds for the NetScan.
We can see from Figure 8 that the rank test for censored data described
in Step 3 of TopRank can detect several types of changes: sudden increase,
slow increase and several types of magnitude of changes.
Table 2 gives the smallest p-value above which the corresponding attack is
detected, as well as the number of false alarms. The number of false alarms
corresponds to the number of IP addresses for which an alarm is triggered
by the TopRank algorithm but which are different from the attacked IP
addresses. For instance, the PortScan attack is detected if α ≥ 10−11 and
the associated number of false alarms is equal to 3.
To compute the number of false alarms, we have considered, as previously,
that the attacked IP addresses were only those for which an attack was gen-
erated, but it is possible that the background ADSL and P2P traffic contains
some other attacks. Figure 9 displays the censored time series of some IP
addresses which were considered to be false alarms in the computation of
Table 2 in the case of the SYN flooding, UDP flooding and NetScan, as well
as the time instant where a change was detected (vertical line).
Since these IP addresses could be considered as being attacked, the results
of Table 2 are computed in the most unfavorable way for our algorithm. This
is a major problem for comparing algorithms on massive data streams. The
issue is that without properly labeled datasets, comparisons cannot be per-
formed using standard methods such as ROC (Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic) curves. A second difficulty is to distinguish the relative merits of the
filtering step and those of the detection step. Finally, a third difficulty arises
in the specific case of Network anomaly detection: Internet traffic is known
to be bursty, with loads varying quite a lot over the day. Hence, the perfor-
mance observed on a 2 hour dataset cannot be generalized without caution,
especially for methods that rely on the choice of numerous parameters. The
parameters of the filtering step can be interpreted in terms of dimension
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Fig. 9. Censored time series for IP addresses considered as false alarm in the case of
SYN and UDP flooding (top: left and right respectively) and in the case of NetScan (bot-
tom). The vertical lines correspond to the detected change-point instants and the uncen-
sored values are displayed with stars (“∗”).
reduction rate and are thus easier to compare. This is much more difficult
as far as the detection step is concerned, since the parameters often need to
be adapted to the statistical characteristics of the traffic data being studied.
The methods proposed by Krishnamurthy et al. (2003), Li et al. (2006),
Salem, Vaton and Gravey (2007) and Abry, Borgnat and Dewaele (2007)
all use as a dimension reduction technique random aggregation (sketches)
which enables them to work on the fly. All these methods use either outlier
detection, or CUSUM in their change detection step, with several parameters
(in addition to the test threshold) that need to be fine-tuned. In practice,
because of the high variability of the loads within one day, the choice of these
parameters might require some expertise. In contrast, our detection step is
purely nonparametric. Since it is based on rank statistics, it only requires
choosing a threshold of the p-value under which an alarm is set off.
In Section 7 we shall compare our filtering steps with random aggregation
filtering on synthetic datasets which are completely labeled.
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5.2.2. Numerical performance. As we have seen, this method seems to
give satisfactory results from a statistical point of view. Moreover, with
M = 10, M ′ = 1, and P = 60, applying the TopRank algorithm takes only
1 minute and 30 seconds to process the whole traffic trace of 67 minutes,
when looking for SYN flooding, UDP flooding, PortScan and NetScan, with
a computer having the following configuration: RAM 1 GB, CPU 3 GHz.
This makes the implementation of the TopRank algorithm very realistic in
detection systems processing data on the fly, even for very intense traffic
data.
6. A toy problem comparing record and aggregation methods. In this
section we briefly introduce and solve a toy problem to compare the effects
of record filtering and random aggregation on data dimension reduction in a
simplified framework. We have considered these two data reduction methods
in the first steps of the TopRank and HashRank algorithms, which aim at
detecting an increase of one (or several) components of aD-dimensional time
series for a large D. For detecting such anomalies, one has to be able to infer
from the reduced data, at each time instant, that one of the components is
indeed large. We consider this inference problem in a case where all the
components have the same known distribution, except possibly one, whose
distribution is obtained by multiplying by a scale factor θ−1 ≥ 1. Hence, we
are in a standard problem of estimating a scalar parameter θ. To compare
the theoretical merits of the two data reduction methods, we simply evaluate
the Fisher information related to the two different observations.
More precisely, let X1, . . . ,XD be D independent random variables with
positive values such that, among them, D− 1 admit the same density p(x)
and one admits the density θp(θx) with θ ∈ (0,1]. We shall compare the
Fisher information associated with the parameter θ for two different obser-
vations:
1. The observation obtained by data dimension reduction using simple record
filtering:
YD = max
k=1,...,D
(Xk).(5)
2. The observation obtained by data dimension reduction using simple ran-
dom aggregation filtering:
ZD =
D∑
k=1
Xk.(6)
The distributions of YD and ZD are both parametrized by θ. We will denote
the corresponding densities by fD,θ and gD,θ respectively, and the corre-
sponding Fisher information quantities [see Bickel and Doksum (1976)] by
ID(θ) = Var(∂θ log fD,θ(YD)) and JD(θ) = Var(∂θ log gD,θ(ZD)).
DETECTION AND LOCALIZATION OF CHANGE-POINTS 21
Suppose that p is 2 times continuously differentiable, has its support in [0,1]
and that
E
[(
p˙
p
(X)
)2]
<∞,
where p˙ denotes the derivative of p and X a random variable with density
p. We claim that, for any θ ∈ (0,1), as D→∞,
ID(θ)→ Var((θ ∨X)(p˙/p)(θ ∨X))
θ2
and JD(θ)∼D−1 (E[X])
2
θ4Var(X)
,(7)
where a∨ b=max(a, b).
Remark 1. Since ID(θ)≍ 1 and JD(θ)≍D−1, this result clearly shows
that, for large D, record filtering is advantageous from an information point
of view in comparison with aggregation filtering. However, the fact that p
has compact support is crucial in this result. We believe that ID would have
different asymptotic behavior if other assumptions were made on the tail
distribution of X . However, we leave this question open for future work.
Let us give some simple arguments to support our claims. It is easy to
show that, as D→∞,
YD
d−→ 1∨ (X/θ).
We admit that this convergence in distribution can be strengthened to estab-
lish that the Fisher information ID tends to the one associated to the limit
distribution. The limiting distribution has density t 7→ θp(θt)/ ∫ 1θ p(u)du
with a support in [0,1/θ] and the corresponding Fisher information is equal
to Var((1 ∨X/θ) p˙p(θ ∨X)). Hence, the left-hand side of (7).
Denote σ2 = Var(X) and µ = E[X] and Z˜D = (
√
D− 1σ)−1(ZD − (D −
1)µ). Observe that the Fisher information associated with the observation
Z˜D is the same as for ZD. The centering and normalization is chosen so
that the sum of the (D− 1) i.i.d. Xi’s in ZD is approximately N (0,1). The
remaining Xi is then divided by
√
D− 1 and thus is negligible as D→∞,
Z˜D
d−→ U with U ∼N (0,1).
In contrast with the previous case, as D→∞, the asymptotic distribution
does not depend on θ. This is why JD(θ)→ 0, as D→∞. To obtain an
equivalent as in (7), we use
ZˆD = U + (θ
√
D− 1σ)−1X
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to approximate the distribution of Z˜D, which is more precise than the limit
distribution. The corresponding density is given by the convolution
pˆθ(x) =
√
D− 1σθ
∫ ∞
t=−∞
g(x− t)p(√D− 1σθt)dt,
where g denotes the density of U . It follows that
∂θ log pˆθ(x) = θ
−1−
∫
g(x− t)q(√D− 1σθt)
θ
∫
g(x− t)p(√D− 1σθt) ,(8)
where q(t) =−tp˙(t). Denote by g˙ the derivative of g. Using a Taylor expan-
sion of g(x− t) around x, one has for a kernel function k such that ∫ k = 1,
as b→ 0, ∫
g(x− t)k(t/b)dt= b
(
g(x)− bg˙(x)
∫
tk(t)dt+O(b2)
)
.
Observing that
∫
q =
∫
p= 1, we may apply this approximation to the con-
volutions appearing in the ratio displayed in (8) with b = (
√
D− 1σθ)−1
and k = q and p successively. Since
∫
tq(t)dt = 2
∫
tp(t)dt = 2µ, we get, as
D→∞,
∂θ log pˆθ(x) = θ
−1
[
1− g(x)− 2µbg˙(x) +O(b
2)
g(x)− µbg˙(x) +O(b2)
]
= θ−1µbg˙(x)/g(x) +O(b2).
Using this approximation, since g˙(x)/g(x) =−x [recall that g is the density
of the N (0,1)] and Var(ZˆD) ∼ 1, we get, as D→∞, Var(∂θ log pˆθ(ZˆD)) ∼
D−1 µ
2
θ4σ2 . Admitting that this provides a good approximation of the Fisher
information of ZD, we get the right-hand side of (7).
7. Application to synthetic data. In Sections 4 and 5 the traffic traces
are not completely labeled. We only have some labeled anomalies, those
generated in the experiments, but many other anomalies, present in the
background ADSL and P2P traffic, are not labeled. Indeed, the amount of
data is too large and all the destination IP addresses cannot be thoroughly
analyzed to make a diagnostic of an anomaly for each of them. Here, we
generate synthetic high-dimensional data corresponding to 1 minute of In-
ternet traffic and containing 1 anomaly. Using Monte Carlo simulations,
ROC curves are obtained for the different detection algorithms, and then
compared.
DETECTION AND LOCALIZATION OF CHANGE-POINTS 23
7.1. Description of the synthetic data. We explain, in the following, how
the number of SYN packets received by the different IP addresses involved
in a given observation window is synthesized in each sub-interval of time
length ∆. For a given IP address, we propose modeling the SYN packet
traffic using a Poisson point process with a given intensity expressed as a
number of SYN packets received per second. In Network applications, each
IP address receives a very different amount of traffic. Hence, we shall use
different intensities from an IP address to another. To take into account this
diversity, we propose using the realizations of a Pareto distribution for the
parameters of the different intensities so that a lot of machines receive a
small number of SYN packets while a few receive a lot.
Let us now further describe the framework of our numerical experiments.
We first randomly generate a sequence (θi)i=1,...,D of intensities for D =
1000 IP addresses with the Pareto distribution having the following density:
γα/(1 + γx)1+α, when x > 0, with α = 2.5 and γ = 0.72, which roughly
corresponds to what we observed in the real traffic traces at our disposal.
Then, we generate the D time series of length P = 60 corresponding to the
number of packets received by each IP address in the 60 sub-intervals of
the observation window, which consists of i.i.d. Poisson random variables,
except for 1 IP address for which a change-point is introduced. Let us denote
by (Yi,j), where 1≤ i≤D and 1≤ j ≤ P , the data thus obtained and by i0
the IP address whose time series contains a change-point at time index
j0 ∈ {1, . . . , P}:
(Yi0,j)1≤j≤j0
i.i.d.∼ Poisson(θi0) and (Yi0,j)j0<j≤P i.i.d.∼ Poisson(ηθi0),
where the parameter η is a positive coefficient. The remaining time series
are generated as follows:
∀i 6= i0, (Yi,j)1≤j≤P i.i.d.∼ Poisson(θi).
In the following, we shall take D = 1000, j0 = 35, P = 60 and η = 2 or η = 7.
A sensible choice of i0 is made by first sorting the IP addresses i ∈ {1, . . . ,D}
so that the parameters θi are in a decreasing order, θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θD. The
choice of i0 is thus related to the difficulty of the detection: the smaller
i0, the easier the detection. For η = 2, we chose i0 = 100 (10th percentile
intensity) and for η = 7, we chose i0 = 500 (median intensity), for which
we have θ100 ≈ 2 and θ500 ≈ 0.4. See Figure 10, where the (θi)1≤i≤D are
displayed.
Figure 11 displays the time series which have been synthesized using the
previously described model corresponding to i = 1, i = i0 and i = 10. The
case where i0 = 100 and η = 2 is displayed on the left and the case where
i0 = 500 and η = 7 on the right.
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Fig. 10. An example of parameters (θi)1≤i≤D . The stars “∗” correspond to θ1, θ100 and
θ500.
Fig. 11. Some synthesized time series (Yi,j)1≤j≤60. Left: i = 1 (“∗”), i = 10 (“+”),
i = i0 = 100 with η = 2 (“ o”). Right: i= 1 (“∗”), i= 10 (“+”), i= i0 = 500 with η = 7
(“ o”).
7.2. ROC curves of the TopRank and HashRank algorithms. Now, we
propose comparing the two approaches presented in Section 3 by computing
their false-alarm and detection rates, which leads to the plot of the ROC
curves displayed hereafter. More precisely, the x-axis and y-axis of the ROC
curves that we consider correspond to the false-alarm rate (the number of
false anomalies divided by D− 1, the number of time series without anoma-
lies) and the detection rate (1 if the anomaly is detected and 0 otherwise),
both averaged over 100 successive Monte Carlo experiments. Each point of
the curve is obtained for a given threshold Pthresh below which a p-value is
classified as an anomaly.
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To make this comparison as fair as possible, the TopRank algorithm has
been modified in order to address a number of time series in the change-point
detection step, equal to the number addressed by the HashRank algorithm.
Using this convention, we ensure an equivalent computational load for both
algorithms, since, in both cases, the detection step is similar (nonparametric
rank test).
In the case of the HashRank algorithm, the number of time series to
which a detection test is applied is equal to L×K with L= 8 and K = 17,
these two values ensuring a small number of collisions. In our experiments,
the smallest value of M for which 8 × 17 = 136 time series can be con-
structed in the TopRank algorithm is M = 50. For this M , we construct
the 136 first time series encountered as the index i goes along the list
i1(1), i1(2), . . . , i1(60), i2(1), i2(2), . . . , i2(60), i3(1), . . . , where the ik(t) are de-
fined in Step 1 of the TopRank algorithm; see Section 3.1.
In Figure 12 are displayed the ROC curves of the TopRank and HashRank
algorithms when i0 = 500 and η = 7 (left) and when i0 = 100 and η = 2
(right). We also plot the ROC curve y = x corresponding to the random
classifier and the ROC curve of the Comprehensive Rank test (which consists
in applying the nonparametric rank test to each time series, i.e., without any
reduction step). Remember that such an approach is not feasible in practice
for anomaly detection on the fly. It is displayed here to highlight the loss
resulting from the data reduction steps.
Let us comment briefly on these results. It appears that the TopRank
algorithm outperforms the HashRank algorithm except in the first case for
high false alarm rates. Indeed, because of the record filtering, it is possible
that the time series indexed by i0 is not analyzed in the detection step and
thus not detected, no matter how close to 1 the threshold Pthresh is chosen.
This is why, on the left in Figure 12, the detection rate is bounded from
above by 0.88. This does not occur on the right because η × θi0 is large
enough so that the time series indexed by i0 is analyzed with a probability
almost equal to 1. As a result, the performance of the TopRank algorithm is
similar to the Comprehensive Rank test, that is, as if no reduction step were
applied. This indicates that the censorship does not affect the sensitivity of
the detection.
Figure 13 shows that the TopRank algorithm seems to reach a detection
rate very close to 1 for a false alarm rate of around 0.04, while the Com-
prehensive Rank test attains this detection for a false alarm rate of around
0.138. This can be explained as follows: some time series falsely detected
as an anomaly by a nonparametric rank test are not selected by the record
filtering step, which diminishes the number of false alarms. More generally,
for the TopRank algorithm, the number of alarms is bounded by the number
of analyzed time series [L×K = 136, which corresponds to a false alarm rate
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Fig. 12. ROC curves using TopRank (“∗”), HashRank (“ o”), random classifier (plain)
and the Comprehensive Rank test (“+”). The anomaly is simulated with, on the left,
i0 = 500, η = 7, on the right, i0 = 100, η = 2.
Fig. 13. Zoom on the top-left part of the graph on the right in Figure 12.
{(L×K)− 1}/(D− 1)≈ 0.136]. This is not the case for the HashRank algo-
rithm, although only L×K time series are analyzed. Indeed, the analyzed
time series are random aggregations of all the raw time series, and all the
IP addresses can be retrieved in the inversion step.
Finally, it is interesting to observe that, in contrast to the TopRank al-
gorithm, the HashRank algorithm has better performance in the first sit-
uation when i0 = 500 and η = 7 than in the second, when i0 = 100, η = 2.
This is because in the first case the jump at the change-point is higher,
(η − 1)θi0 ≈ 6× 0.4 = 2.4 in comparison to (η − 1)θi0 ≈ 2.
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8. Conclusion. In this paper we propose and compare two anomaly de-
tection methods for identifying DoS attacks in Internet traffic: the TopRank
algorithm based on a record filtering technique followed by a nonparametric
rank test for censored data and the HashRank algorithm based on random
aggregation followed by a standard nonparametric rank test. In the course
of this study, we have shown that the TopRank algorithm is a very effi-
cient technique to detect several types of DoS attacks, as well as PortScan
and NetScan. More precisely, the TopRank algorithm has two main features
which make it very attractive. First, it is able to adapt to various types and
intensities of traffic thanks to the nonparametric property of the test stage.
Second, its computational simplicity and efficiency make its implementation
feasible on the fly. This on-the-fly implementation has been tested in the
context of an experimental detection system that we have jointly developed
with France-Te´le´com and the other partners involved in the ANR-RNRT
OSCAR project.
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